A palace intrigue

Because President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s new palace occupies a central place in political discussions, the transformation of intrigue into a general policy should be considered normal. This is a geography where the palace plots and intrigues have the power to determine the fate of the country. The term “Byzantine intrigue” is used to describe this phenomenon. Intrigue means that a power struggle is conducted through plots based on personalities and personal ambitions. Sometimes what is manifest and what is hidden seem to be contradictory.

Erdogan, violating a major constitutional rule that the president should be impartial, carries on a campaign in favor of the Justice and Development (AK Party) and engages in polemics with opposition parties. This shows that Erdogan wants an election victory for the AK Party. What if the opposite is true? What if Erdogan wants the AK Party to lose? The fact that this possibility does not have a negative outcome for the personal ambitions of Erdogan suggests that we need to take the intrigues pretty seriously. If the AK Party loses the election, Erdogan will still remain in power as president. Erdogan will have the opportunity to redesign the AK Party in case of an election failure of the AK Party. Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoilu will have to step down and be replaced by a figure who will be fully loyal to Erdogan. In the meantime, there will be rumors that Erdogan will leave presidency to control the party. Let us assume that a Republican People’s Party (CHP)-Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) minority coalition, supported by the AK Party, comes to power. The new government will take over a ruined economy. The recent flow of cash into Turkey to keep the currency rate stable should be seen as proof that the economy is suffering. The delayed economic crisis will be seen as the fault of the new government. Due to coalition debates as well as social upheaval because of the economic crisis, the image of the government will be undermined. The settlement process will affect the delicate balances of the weak coalition government. The Kurdish issue will enter a new phase. Turkey will also be affected by the spillover of the Syrian civil war and will face a series of other problems.

On the other hand, Erdogan will push the idea of quotthe president elected by popular votequot to undermine the image of the coalition government. The bureaucratic oligarchy created over time to be subordinate to Erdogan will preserve its autonomy under the auspices of Erdogan and turn into a new power center. The coalition government will soon exhaust its energy and when the conditions are ripe, Erdogan will employ his constitutional powers to put the country through another election. This time, Erdogan will promote the Turkish-type presidential system more strongly in the election campaign and ask for popular support for this project. This is Turkey a political plan involving intricate plots is not illogical. A plan B scenario in which Erdogan loses the election is possible. Erdogan occupies the presidential office through popular support, even if this support would not be sufficient to win an election. He has nothing to lose. He has the necessary experience and tools to transform a post-election crisis into an opportunity. But there is one huge obstacle that he does not care about: Turkey lost its legal order and the real reason for the approaching political and economic crisis is the inability of the government to govern the country because of the destruction of the legal system. In short, Erdogan may be held responsible for this, and this intricate plan may be the end of his political life.

SOURCE: Today’s Zaman